When Constitutional Rights Clash: \u3cem\u3eMasterpiece Cakeshop\u27s\u3c/em\u3e Potential Legacy by Hyle, Ken
200 
WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CLASH: 
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S POTENTIAL LEGACY 
Ken Hyle* 
In December, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument 
in the highly anticipated case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission.1 Jack Phillips, who has owned and operated 
Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado for over 22 years, declined 
to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on his Christian 
belief that same-sex couples should not marry.2 The couple filed charges 
with the Colorado Civil Rights Division for discrimination in a place of 
public accommodation based on sexual orientation, violating the 
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA). An Administrative Law 
Judge ruled in favor of the couple, requiring Phillips to bake cakes for 
couples of all sexual orientations and to ensure his staff is properly trained 
to comply with CADA.3 
The question presented to the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop is 
whether CADA violates Jack Phillips’ rights under the Free Exercise and 
Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution by compelling him to create a cake for the same-sex couple.4 
This specific legal issue is undoubtedly one of great national importance, 
as the case is an appropriate vehicle for the Court to bring some clarity to 
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in Constitutional Law, from Columbia Law School in 2017. The views expressed in this essay are 
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
1. Transcript of Oral Argument, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n, Dec. 5, 2017 (No. 16-111), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f314.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN9L-5T9T].  
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Comm’n, No. 16-111, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/16-111-cert-
petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WJ2-5U2Q}. 
3. Id. at 6-7. 
4. Id. at i. 
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an area of law that affects multiple wedding industries across the United 
States.5 
The Court, however, should avoid limiting its decision to this very 
narrow issue. Masterpiece Cakeshop presents an opportunity for the Court 
to expound upon a broader, more fundamental constitutional issue – what 
is the optimal legal framework for resolving direct conflicts between 
constitutional rights? In Part I of this essay, I argue that the Court’s current 
approach to resolving such conflicts is flawed because it establishes a 
hierarchy of constitutional rights.  In Part II, I argue that the optimal legal 
framework is actually embedded in precedent and the Court should use 
Masterpiece Cakeshop to revive this framework to guide courts in 
refereeing these conflicts in a fair and balanced manner. 
I. THE COURT’S CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO RIGHTS 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court finds itself directing traffic at 
the crossroads of the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and 
Colorado’s enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause through CADA.6 There is little disagreement that each of these 
constitutional rights should be afforded close judicial scrutiny. If each 
right holds equal value by way of its inclusion in the Constitution, what is 
the proper method for courts to determine winners and losers when these 
rights are in a state of conflict with each other? 
The Court’s line of questioning during oral argument in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop lends some insight into how it might address this legal 
conundrum. This perceived approach incorporates an examination of 
government interests and the means required to advance those interests 
within the traditional levels of scrutiny. During oral argument, the Court’s 
treatment of the Free Exercise Clause, one of the rights in a state of 
conflict in Masterpiece Cakeshop, illustrates this point. Justice Kennedy’s 
questions to Frederick Yarger, who represents the State of Colorado, 
invoke a potential Employment Division v. Smith analysis by the Court.7 
Specifically, Justice Kennedy states, “in this case . . . Commissioner Hess 
says freedom of religion used to justify discrimination is a despicable 
5. See, e.g., State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (2017) (flower shop 
owner refused to design floral arrangements for a same-sex wedding); Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (2013) (owner of a photography business refused to provide services for a 
commitment ceremony for a same-sex couple). 
6. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause would be implicated if the State of 
Colorado were to create a religious exemption to the sexual orientation provision of CADA. 
7. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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piece of rhetoric.”8 If a majority of the Court finds the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission exhibited hostility to religion, the Smith precedent 
triggers a strict scrutiny analysis.9 On the other hand, if a majority of the 
Court does not find any evidence of religious hostility and determines 
CADA is a neutral law of general applicability in both text and operation, 
then the Court would conduct a rational basis review.10 
To demonstrate the inherent flaw to this approach, I start with the 
premise that the Court has historically rejected a hierarchy of 
constitutional rights. The Court has noted that there should not be a 
presumption that one constitutional right is superior to another 
constitutional right. In the 1976 case Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 
the Court was presented with the question as to whether the entry of an 
order restraining several members of the press from publishing or 
broadcasting accounts of admission by the accused in a criminal case 
violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press under the 
First Amendment.11 The Court was deeply concerned that the petitioners 
wanted the Court to declare the right of a criminal defendant subordinate 
to their First Amendment right to publish in all circumstances. The 
Court noted in response, “[t]he authors of the Bill of Rights did not 
undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”12 Rejecting 
the petitioners’ absolute claim of superiority,13 the Court proceeded to 
examine the evidence before the trial judge to determine the nature and 
extent of pretrial news coverage, whether other measures would be 
likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity, and 
how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the 
threatened danger.14 After weighing these factors and balancing the 
interests of both parties, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.15 
8. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 51.  https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f314.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN9L-5T9T].  
9. Strict scrutiny analysis was later applied in the free exercise context in Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 522 (1993). Mr. Yarger raises this case in response 
to the Justices’ questions on the Free Exercise Clause. See Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 56. 
10. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. 
11. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
12. Id. at 561. 
13. Id. The Court further noted: “[I]f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the
potential conflicts between them were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one 
priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined 
to do. It is unnecessary, after nearly two centuries, to establish a priority applicable in all 
circumstances.” Id.  
14. Id. at 562. 
15. Id. at 540. 
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In the end, the Court avoided establishing a de facto hierarchy of 
constitutional rights by weighing and examining the unique facts 
presented in the case at hand.16 
The Court’s purported fallback to a categorical approach involving 
levels of scrutiny to resolve cases where constitutional rights collide is 
flawed in that it creates a hierarchy of constitutional rights. Under this 
approach, courts can frame controversies in a manner that assign 
seemingly insurmountable legal burdens on one party, which 
consequently leads to predetermined results. Under a traditional level of 
scrutiny analysis, courts examine government interests and the means 
necessary to achieve those interests for just one of the two constitutional 
rights in conflict. To further compound this problem, the court typically 
evaluates broad, macro-level government interests, which are susceptible 
to rubber stamping. As such, this categorical approach promotes an 
uneven playing field where one constitutional right has a deliberate 
advantage over the other constitutional right. 
Assume a majority of the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop finds that 
the statements attributed to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission trigger 
a rational-basis review under Smith. As the Court has previously 
explained, “action by a legislature is presumed to be valid” when courts 
apply the rational-basis standard.17 This notion of judicial restraint, 
embodied in rational basis review, is especially problematic when 
constitutional rights clash. As described in FCC v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., “[o]n rational-basis review, a classification in a 
statute. . . comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity . . . and 
those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the 
burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”18 
Applying this standard in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Jack Phillips would bear 
the near impossible burden of showing that Colorado does not have a 
legitimate government interest in providing equal access to public areas 
for classes of individuals who have been historically denied equal access; 
or, assuming Jack Phillips concedes that it is a legitimate government 
interest, CADA itself is not rationally related to achieving that interest. 
There is no conceivable legal basis to question the rationality of passing 
16. The Court rejected a categorical approach to resolving competing constitutional interests
by noting in the opinion that “[t]he problems presented in this case have a substantial history outside 
the reported decisions of the courts, in the efforts of many responsible people to accommodate the 
competing interests. We cannot resolve all of them, for it is not the function of this Court to write a 
code. We look instead to this particular case and the legal context in which it arises.” Id. at 550-51.  
17. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). 
18. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (citing Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
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an anti-discrimination law to advance equal access in public 
accommodations. Additionally, at a macro-level, the overarching 
government interest of CADA is the enforcement of a constitutional right–
namely the Equal Protection Clause. It is unlikely that anyone would 
question the legitimacy of the government’s attempts to secure 
fundamental constitutional rights cloaked in the notion of equality. Thus, 
the absolute nature of rational-basis review blocks courts from 
considering the interests of the party with the impenetrable burden. If the 
Court were to apply rational basis review in Masterpiece Cakeshop, it 
would effectively prevent Jack Phillips from demonstrating how 
Colorado’s enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, through CADA, 
potentially burdens him at an individual level. Under this analysis, the 
Free Exercise Clause is automatically subordinated to the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
On the other end of the spectrum is strict scrutiny analysis.19 Assume 
now that a majority of the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop finds that the 
statements attributed to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission trigger a 
strict scrutiny analysis under Smith and Lukumi. Strict scrutiny requires 
that a law be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government 
interest.20 Here, the burden shifts from Jack Phillips to the State of 
Colorado. The first prong is generally not at issue because the government 
will always have a compelling interest in enforcing a fundamental 
constitutional right. However, the second prong is particularly 
problematic. The State of Colorado must demonstrate that enforcement of 
the Equal Protection Clause through CADA is narrowly tailored to 
achieve the compelling interest. The second prong is closely intertwined 
with the least-restrictive-means standard, which the Court has previously 
described as exceptionally demanding.21 The Court in recent years has 
strongly suggested this standard places an unlimited burden on the 
government to fund alternative programs to achieve stated government 
interests.22 In this case, the Court could conceivably, under this principle, 
force the State of Colorado to open special cake shops or similar venues 
to serve customers who are denied service on religious grounds. Under 
19. This view has been described as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.” (a phrase that originated in 
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
20. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978). 
21. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014) (citing City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). 
22. Id. at 2780-82. 
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this analysis, there is a presumption that the Free Exercise Clause is 
superior to the Equal Protection Clause. 
II. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The primary issue with the categorical approach is that undue 
emphasis is placed on broad government interests and government action 
at the macro-level, both of which are ripe for manipulation, rubber 
stamping, and predetermined results by the courts. Ultimately, the 
categorical approach leads to a hierarchy of constitutional rights because 
it fails to consider the individual, micro-level interests at stake under the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case. How, then, does the Court 
establish a level playing field in these types of cases? I propose that the 
optimal legal framework can be extracted from the Court’s decisions in 
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department.23 
In Rowan, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of Title III 
of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, under which a 
person may require a mailer to remove his name from its mailing lists to 
the householder.24 At specific issue was a section of the law entitled 
“Prohibition of pandering advertisements in the mails,” which provided a 
procedure for any householder to “insulate himself from advertisements 
that offer for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion 
believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative.”25 The Court in 
Rowan was essentially required to resolve a direct conflict between the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the penumbra right of 
privacy emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.26 
The Court in Rowan resolved this conflict by weighing the individual 
costs and burdens placed on each party to the controversy.27 Under this 
balancing methodology, the Court’s goal is to determine which party 
23. Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dept’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
24. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 729. 
25. Id. at 729-30. 
26. Id. at 731. The Court states: “But the right of every person to be let alone must be placed
in the scales with the right of others to communicate.” Id. at 736. 
27. This general principle was also invoked six years later in Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart. Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Stuart, the Court weighed the costs associated 
with the competing interests of the Sixth Amendment and First Amendment. For example, in 
reference to the Sixth Amendment interests, the Court noted: “[i]n the most extreme cases. . . .the risk 
of injustice was avoided when the convictions were reversed. But a reversal means that justice has 
been delayed for both the defendant and the State; in some cases, because of the lapse of time retrial 
is impossible or further prosecution is gravely handicapped.” Id. at 555. In regard to the First 
Amendment interests, the Court noted: “[a] prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an 
immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after 
publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the time.” Id. at 559. 
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would have to make the greatest sacrifice of its protected liberty under the 
specific facts and circumstances of the case if the Court ruled against 
them.28 In Rowan, the Court recognized that a substantial burden was 
placed on a citizen receiving offensive, unsolicited mail: “[t]he citizen 
cannot be put to the burden of determining on repeated occasions whether 
the offending mailer has altered its material so as to make it acceptable. 
Nor should the householder have to risk that offensive material come into 
the hands of his children before it can be stopped.”29 Additionally, the 
Court in Rowan acknowledged that the costs associated in the removal of 
names from mailing lists were significant to the mailers.30 In the end, after 
weighing these costs and burdens, the Rowan Court determined the 
householders would have to make the greatest sacrifice among the 
competing individual liberties and ultimately ruled in their favor.31 
This pragmatic approach, with a focus on individual costs and 
burdens of each party, is likely to drive a more balanced analysis by the 
Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop in contrast to an analysis employing the 
traditional levels of scrutiny. Consider, for example, the costs and burdens 
facing Jack Phillips. If he fails to make cakes for same-sex weddings, he 
is subject to tangible harm in the form of fines, additional resources 
expended on remedial training for his staff, and potentially the loss of his 
business and livelihood. He is also subject to the intangible harm to his 
conscience for violating his sincere religious beliefs. For the same-sex 
couple, they suffered a degree of emotional harm as a result of the 
incident. While the couple may have arguably had alternative options to 
receive service at a different cake shop, the unique artistry of the requested 
good for an important ceremonial occasion may have also created 
additional obstacles for them to receive service at a different cake shop. 
As previously discussed, it is not necessary for the Court in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop to consider any of these micro-level factors under a traditional 
28. This approach is strikingly similar to the pragmatic balancing advanced by Judge Richard 
Posner: 
There may be no objective method of valuing the competing interests. But analysis can be 
made more manageable by pragmatically recasting the question as not which of the com-
peting interests is more valuable but what are the consequences for each interest of decid-
ing the case one way rather than the other. If one outcome involves a much smaller sacri-
fice of one of the competing interests, then unless the two are of very different value that 
outcome will probably have the better overall consequences.  
See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 242-43 (2008). 
29. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738. 
30. Id. at 740. 
31. Id. 
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analysis using the various levels of scrutiny. By evading these factors 
under that approach, the Court is inclined to make presumptions about the 
superiority of certain constitutional rights over others. The pragmatic 
balancing test discussed in this section provides a safe haven from such 
decisions by forcing Courts to articulate and then weigh the individual 
costs and burdens of all parties. 
III. CONCLUSION
Without question, the narrow issue before the Court in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop is of national importance. But it is not the first case of its kind. 
The effects have been felt beyond the State of Colorado and the wedding 
industry; small business owners from all over the country are often 
forced to violate their sincere religious convictions without due 
consideration of their First Amendment interests. 
At the same time, the implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop run 
deeper as a matter of constitutional law. Masterpiece Cakeshop presents 
an opportunity for the Court to revive a fair and balanced legal framework 
for resolving conflicts between constitutional rights. The Court’s current 
flawed approach shifts focus away from individual interests and toward 
broad, macro-level government interests, which promotes the 
establishment of a presumptive hierarchy of constitutional rights. The 
Court needs to shift its focus back to a legal model that places individual 
interests at the forefront of its analysis. If the underlying purpose of 
constitutional rights is to safeguard individual liberty, a balanced 
approach to resolving conflicts between constitutional rights should 
necessarily require judges to articulate and weigh the individual costs and 
burdens associated with enforcing them. 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop conflict has a potential legacy beyond 
religion, speech, and various wedding industries. The Court’s search for a 
level playing field is more important than ever as new constitutional 
conflicts continue to emerge, such as the apparent conflict between the 
First and Second Amendments.32 
32. See, e.g., David M. Shapiro, Commentary: Guns, Speech, Charlottesville: The Semiotics of 
Semiautomatics, 106 GEO L.J. ONLINE (2017).  
